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1. The Introduction 
 
In summer 2015, Chinese securities market experienced a black month. From 12th June to 
8th July, the SSE composite Index fell from 5178.19 to 3421.53, and a double-dip in the 
August to 2850. Although the government published several urgent polies to contain the 
declining tendency, the aftermath of  stock-market turbulence had not smoothed down 
until the beginning of  2016. During this market crash, over ¥ 1 trillion market value 
evaporated. Both the regulatory authority and the market agreed that the leverage was the 
reason of  the market crash. 
 
This article is divided into six sections. In the next section, the research mainly focuses on 
the theory of  the securities regulation and the history of  Chinese securities regulation. The 
third section talks about several paths for stock financing and how those agencies tried to 
avoid the regulation. Section four talks about the legal, technical and market supporting of  
stock leverage financing. Section five discusses the legal foundation and the regulatory logic 
of  the CRSC. The last section gives some suggestions to improve the current Chinese 
regulatory framework. 
 
2. The theory of securities regulation 
2.1 The general principle of  securities regulation 
 
According to Black’s Law Dictionary1, ‘regulation’ means ‘control over something by rule 
or restriction’. Therefore, in this dissertation, ‘regulation’ is defined as ‘restriction and 
                                                   
1 A Garner Bryan, Black’s Law Dictionary, vol 9 (2009). 
ICGFREL DISSERTATION 1544918 
5 
 
interference conducted by regulator to the targets by law, economic and administrative 
enforcements’. 
 
Although securities regulation is an important part of  financial regulation, there are 
different explanations to the definition of  ‘securities regulation’. Nicolaisen believed that 
the securities regulation is restriction, interference and guidance conducted by the 
government and regulatory authority to securities market by law, economic and 
administrative enforcements in aim of  adjusting the problem in the securities market.2 
While Avgerinos declared that securities regulation means that a regulatory authority 
supervises and control the issuing and trading of  the securities according to the securities 
law in order to ensure the markets function properly. 3 Although there are different 
explanations to securities regulation, the essence of  it is similar, which contains regulator, 
jurisdiction of  securities regulation, aim of  securities regulation and method of  securities 
regulation. 
 
2.1.1 Securities market regulator 
 
The regulator generally contains government, relative institution and individual. In the case 
of  securities markets, the regulator can be governmental organisation or self-regulation 
institution. The diversity is based on the development of  nations and the differences in 
political and economic systems. In addition, the emergence and development of  securities 
regulation are alongside the securities markets. In the stage of  emergence of  securities 
markets, the regulation is based on the market itself  and the emergence of  exchange 
reflects the institutionalisation and normalisation of  self-restraint and self-regulation. In 
the early development stage of  securities markets, institutions like securities exchanges and 
                                                   
2 Donald T Nicolaisen, ‘Securities Regulator Looks at Convergence, A’ (2004) 25 Nw. J. Int’l L. 
& Bus. 661. 
3  Yannis V Avgerinos, ‘EU Financial Market Supervision Revisited: The European Securities 
Regulator’ [2003] Jean Monnet Working Papers. 
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securities associations become the executor of  the market regulation. However, with the 
further development of  securities markets, economic crisis and financial crisis force the 
governments to step in the markets and conduct the role of  regulation. In some countries 
like America, the status of  governmental regulation has surpassed the self-regulation and 
become the theme of  securities regulation. Even in the United Kingdom, whose securities 
regulation is mainly based on self-regulation, the government has started to step in. 
However, the governmental regulation has not been overemphasised at the expense of  the 
self-regulation, they are both mainstream in securities regulation. 
 
2.1.2 The aim of  securities regulation 
 
The International Organization of  Securities Commissions (IOSCO) sets out three aims 
of  securities regulation. They are: (1) protecting investors; (2) ensuring that markets are 
fair, efficient and transparent, and; (3) reducing systemic risk.4 Although we have a unified 
international standard, the expressions of  the aim of  securities regulation in countries 
around the world are very different. For example, the Securities Act of  1933 contained two 
fundamental aims: (1) providing related material information in public offering to investors, 
and; (2) prohibiting any actions related to misdirection and fraud in securities trading.5 On 
the other hand, according to the newest Chinese Securities Law, the aims of  this law are: 
(1) standardising the issuing and trading of  the securities; (2) protecting the interest of  
investors; (3) safeguarding the socioeconomic order and public interest and; (4) promoting 
the development of  the socialist market economic system.6 
 
In the view of  developed and emerging markets, the aim of  securities regulation can be 
summarised into two levels. The first level focuses on short-term objectives, which are 
                                                   
4  ‘OICV-IOSCO - Iosco.org’ 
<https://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=key_regulatory_standards> accessed 1 August 2016. 
5 Securities Act of 1933. 
6 Securities Law of The People’s Republic of China 2005. 
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preventing market failure, protecting the interest of  investors (especially minority 
investors), maintaining the just of  the market and facilitating the market to function 
normally. However, the second level sets up long-term objectives, which pay more 
attention on macro-economic level. Thus, they contain the objectives to ensure the stability 
and efficiency of  securities markets to improve the growth of  national economy. 
 
2.1.3 The jurisdiction of  securities regulation 
 
According to Fabozzi and Modigliani,7 the jurisdiction of  securities regulation can be 
divided into four parts. (1) Disclosure regulation requires the issuers of  securities to 
disclosure relative financial information to actual and potential investors. (2) Financial 
activity regulation contains provisions about securities traders and trading in the 
securities markets (e.g. provision against insider dealing). (3) Regulation of  financial 
institutions restricts activities like lending, borrowing and funding. (4) Regulation of  
foreign participants mainly limits the controls and ownership of  financial institutions by 
foreign firms in domestic markets.  
 
2.1.4 Methods of  securities regulation 
 
The methods of  securities regulation consist of  law, economic and administrative 
enforcements. Among these methods, the law enforcement means that the government 
regulates the markets through legislation to control and eliminate fraud, manipulation of  
the markets, insider dealing and speculation.  
 
The second method is economic enforcement. The government use this method to 
                                                   
7 Frank J Fabozzi and others, Foundations of Financial Markets and Institutions (2014) 13–14. 
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indirectly influence the markets and its participants by two main approaches: (1) Credit 
financing. By adjusting deposit reserve ratio, discount rate and open market operations, 
the government has a significant influence on the market and can stimulate or restrain it 
in order to stabilise any irrational fluctuations. (2) Taxation. By adjusting capital gains tax 
or securities transactions tax, the cost of  securities will float, accordingly, the markets are 
stimulated or restrained by the government. 
 
In contrast to the second method, the administrative enforcement means the direct 
interference and control by the government on the markets through policies. For example, 
in the stage of  issuing of  securities, a licensing system is set up to control the classification 
and scale of  public companies; or temporary speed bump while trading. Although 
administrative enforcements are commonly adopted by the most of  countries, the 
implement are more often in the emerging markets than developed markets. In the early 
stage of  securities markets, it is understandable to use administrative enforcement due to 
unsound legislation and inefficient supervision. However, with the development of  market 
economy and securities markets, too much administrative interference may cause over-
regulation and distortion in market mechanism. 
 
2.2 The theory and characteristic of  emerging securities market regulation 
2.2.1 The review of  the theory of  emerging market regulation 
 
Back to 1950-1960s, many economists emphasise on the importance of  government 
interference. Paul Rosenstein-Rodan declared that the market mechanism had its drawback 
even in the perfect competition, and in order to maximise and optimise the national income, 
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the government must interfere the economy according to plan. 89  Likewise, the 
Neoclassical Synthesis suggested to apply macro fiscal and monetary policies to adjust 
economic activities in capitalism society, in order to have a stable growth and avoid crisis.10 
These theories gave strong support to emerging market regulation and became its 
theoretical background. 
 
However, some scholars also believed that the existence of  market failure and the 
demanding enforcing power from economic society to the securities market determined 
the necessity of  the existence of  regulation. To achieve the equilibrium between market 
failure and government failure, and evaluate the cost between the laissez-faire and 
government interference, while the government’s dealing the relation with the market, the 
Chicago School stated the theory of  interest group and rent-seeking theory. 1112 The idea 
is that economic regulation is result of  the interaction between the political power and the 
economic interest of  regulated sector, in addition, the rent-seeking from the interest group 
is also an important reflection of  regulation failure. The regulation systems of  emerging 
countries are very different from the developed countries’, the vulnerabilities of  the system 
and many institutional arrangements in the early stage of  markets will cause the rent-
seeking problem more severe. Ultimately, this activity leads to huge amount waste of  
economic resource, and on the other hand, distortion of  the market mechanism. 
 
Actually, the type of  securities regulation that emerging countries should choose is based 
on the objective that country wants to reach and the cost of  implementing such kind of  
                                                   
8  Paul N Rosenstein-Rodan, ‘Notes on the Theory of the “big Push”’, Economic 
Development for Latin America (Springer 1961). 
9 Paul Narziss Rosenstein-Rodan, Pricing and Fiscal Policies: A Study in Method, vol 3 (MIT Press 
1964). 
10 Paul Anthony Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis (1948). 
11 Theo Surányi-Unger and Marver H Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission 
(1955). 
12 George J Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ [1971] The Bell journal of economics 
and management science 3. 
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securities regulation. In other words, the optimal scheme of  deciding securities regulation 
system is: on the premise that fulfilling the government’s objective in a certain period of  
time, pursuing the lowest cost to implement such regulation system. For example, many 
emerging markets adapt licensing systems in initial public offerings (IPO), the reason is 
that the investors there are irrational and lack of  the knowledge compared to the developed 
market, so the governments pay more attention on ‘educating investors rationality and 
knowledge’. The differences in objectives of  different countries cause different choices in 
securities regulation. 
 
2.2.2 The comparative analysis between emerging markets and developed markets 
 
From the empirical perspective, whether in developed markets or emerging markets, there 
are several common fundamental principles that complied by both side, such as fair-and-
square. 1314  However, there is no single standard in all aspects and links of  different 
securities markets, each market may be different in aspects like trading, clearing, transfer 
or issuing. In the level of  regulation, there are three main difference between emerging 
markets and developed markets: 
 
The differences in functions of  governments. In developed markets, the main function 
of  the government is to clear obstacles that cannot be smoothed away by market itself, 
such as manipulations or information failure. In addition, the problems like amount of  
financing or volatility of  index tend to leave to the market itself, the role of  government 
is more focused on ‘standard’ than ‘development’. While the governments in emerging 
markets have not only role of  ‘standard’, but also ‘development’ (where the latter is often 
prior to the former). Here the role of  ‘development’ contains two meanings: On one hand, 
it means the efforts of  governments in growing macro economy and securities regulation 
                                                   
13 Chinese Securities Law 2015. 
14 Securities Act of 1933 (n 5). 
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innovation to develop the securities markets. On the other hand, the government pays 
more attention to social economy related to the market, which means stricter rules choice 
in securities regulations. 
 
The tendency of  avianization in government interference. For the emerging markets, 
the developing direction should be ‘developing into standardisation’. With the 
establishment of  market system, the role of  ‘development’ of  government will gradually 
resign and the role of  ‘standard’ shall be strengthened. The more mature the market is, the 
more direct interference will be considered as over-regulation, especially in the aspects of  
capital financing. 
 
The differences in regulation objective and idea. From the history in regulation of  
developed markets, protecting the interest of  investors is always the mainstream. Based on 
this objective, the governments emphasise more on the fair competition and fair treatment 
among the market participants; control on the fraud, monopoly, manipulation and insider 
dealing; diversity of  the risk and; confidence protection. Nevertheless, the governments in 
the emerging markets appeal to interfere the markets more directly extensively and 
specifically. Compared to developed markets, they often put objectives like quantity of  
capital, improving of  corporate governance, education for the investors and the externality 
of  securities market on the priority. 
 
2.3 A review of  the development of  Chinese Securities Regulation before 2015 ── 
In the view of  governmental regulation and self-regulation 
 
In 1990, after the applications of  Shanghai and Shenzhen local governments, the central 
government approved their plan. On 26th November 1990, the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SSE) was set up and on 1st December 1990, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) started 
its soft opening. The establishment of  SSE and SZSE turned a new page in the Chinese 
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capital market and China has also experienced ups and downs with the world in last two 
decades. 
 
Backing to 1990s, the SSE and SZSE were the result of  the policy of  reform and opening, 
and the Shanghai and Shenzhen local governments were the key enablers during the 
establishment. In the last 20 years’ development of  securities markets, the path of  
institutional transition was led and pushed by the government. In one word, like other 
emerging markets, China’s securities regulation is government-oriented and there are many 
administrative interferences in securities regulation. The development of  securities 
regulation in China in past two decades can be divided into three periods: local government 
in dominance, collegiality by local government and central government and central 
government in dominance. Accordingly, the rights and space of  self-regulation has 
experienced four stages: rising, decline, bottom and recover. 
 
2.3.1 Local government in dominance (1990-1992) 
 
In this period, the securities markets were considered as local experiments, most listed 
companies, investors and securities institutions were from Shanghai and Shenzhen. Before 
1992, there was no unified regulation on Chinese securities regulation, nominally the 
financial management department of  People’s Bank of  China 15  (PBC) should be 
responsible for the regulation, however other government departments, like the State 
Commission for Restructuring the Economic System, National Development and Reform 
Commission, and State Administration of  Foreign Exchange, all could regulate the 
securities and securities market in their jurisdiction. 
 
                                                   
15 In early development of capital market, the PBC was appointed as supervisor. According to 
Provisional regulations on the banks of People’s Republic of China, Article 5, section 11 , one of 
the duties of PBC was ‘regulate securities like stocks and bonds and regulate financial markets’. 
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In the establishment period, SSE and SZSE were local securities exchanges and regulated 
by local governments. In this period, due to lack of  experience in securities regulation, the 
local governments relied on the exchanges in manage, regulate and organise markets and 
many institutional innovations were carried by the exchanges as well. The self-regulation 
and the independence of  the exchanges were relative high at this stage, they had a wide 
range of  market management power and had set up a series of  rules to adjust and 
standardise the operations in the markets. 
 
2.3.2 Collegiality by local government and central government (1993-1996) 
 
In October 1992, the Securities Commission of  State Council 16 (SCSC) and China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) were established. In 1993, both Commissions 
started operation, which meant the central government began intervene and regulate the 
securities markets, the period of  collegiality began. In this stage, the SCSC was the decision 
maker in securities regulation and the CSRC was the executing agency and actual regulator. 
Parallel to the changes in the regulator, the SSE and SZSE started to break the area limit 
and spread to the whole country. At this period, a national wide securities law system 
gradually set up, the rules of  issuing, IPO and transactions trended to unify. 
 
After the interference of  central government, the space of  self-regulation started to decline. 
For example, firstly, the ability of  exchanges to design the institution for the securities 
markets was weakened. Meanwhile the SCSC and CSRC issued a series of  laws and rules, 
such as Provisional Regulation on stock issuing and trading and provisional regulation on the securities 
exchanges in order to establish a unified national wide securities market. On one hand, the 
issue of  these rules restrain the ability of  exchanges to design and provide the institution. 
                                                   
16 On 17th December 1992, the State Council published Notice of the State Council on further 
strengthening the macro-regulation on the securities markets, and appointed SCSC as the 
supreme authority on securities regulation. 
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On the other hand, the rules also limited some regulatory power belonged to exchanges. 
Secondly, the independence and autonomy of  exchanges gradually went down. According 
to the provisional regulation on the securities exchanges, the exchanges were regulated under dual 
system ── the local government and the SCSC. However, the SCSC and CSRC paid more 
attention on the stock issue and IPO at this period, and the dual system had not intervened 
the core activity of  exchanges, which was organising and managing the securities market. 
(The exchanges still had some extent of  flexibility on product innovation and trading 
mechanism) 
 
2.3.3 Central government in dominance (1998-now) 
 
In August 1998, the State Council put SSE and SZSE under the regulation of  the CSRC, 
integrated the SCSC and CSRC into a new CSRC and declared the CSRC as the only 
regulatory authority to the securities markets. Through these three steps, the regulation of  
the exchanges was totally controlled by the central government. In December, the first 
Chinese Securities Law was enacted, according to Article 1 Section 7,17 the securities 
markets shall be under a centralised and unified regulation. So far, a vertical regulation 
system led by the CSRC was formed, the CSRC became the leader and regulator of  the 
Chinese securities markets. 
 
With the establishment of  unified regulatory system, the development of  securities 
markets relied more and more on the will of  the government, the self-regulation fell into 
bottom. There are five main aspects that reflected this change: (1) the appointment of  
management in exchanges must be approved by the CSRC. (2) The formulation and 
adjustment of  the operational rules in exchanges must be led, involved and approved by 
the CSRC. (3) The decision-making power of  new products and adjustment of  standards 
of  charge also controlled by the CSRC. (4) The adjustment of  some trading mechanisms 
                                                   
17 Securities Law of The People’s Republic of China 1998. 
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like methods of  reporting needed to be approved by the CSRC. (5) The power of  deciding 
public offering, suspension or termination became legitimate power of  the CSRC. 
 
The situation continued until October 2005, the new Chinese Securities Law was enacted. 
Dislike the former one, this edition recovered some functions of  self-regulation to 
exchanges and defined the legal status of  exchanges as self-regulation organisations, so this 
period was called as a recover stage of  self-regulation. The recover can be summarised into 
five points:18 
 
Establishing the exchanges as the legal person to self-regulation and defining the legal 
status and nature of  self-regulation. (Article 102) 
 
Reverting the ‘administrative power’, such as the power of  deciding public offering, 
suspension or termination to ‘self-regulation power’. (Article 68, 55, 56, 60 and 61)19 
 
Granting ‘residual legislative power’ to the exchanges, allowing them to amend the rules 
of  deciding public offering, suspension or termination. (Article 50, 55, 56) 
 
Abolishing some legal limitations in securities trading, such as extending the scope of  
market participants, making it possible for further participants other than securities 
companies to become members. (Article 110) 
 
Extending the statutory limits of  the exchanges in trading regulation, as needed, the 
exchanges had power to restrict the transactions of  some accounts with severe unusual 
trading activities. (Article 115) 
 
                                                   
18 Securities Law of The People’s Republic of China (n 6). 
19 In reality, as the CSRC still controlled the power of securities issuance, so the exchanges were 
given back the power of listing securities nominally and could not execute it in practice. 
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Although the new Chinese Securities Law recovered some powers of  self-regulation, in 
practice, the implement of  the powers could only stay in the legal provisions. From legal 
perspective, exchanges are regulated by the CSRC according to Chinese Securities Law and 
Provision about regulating securities exchanges 20 , the relationship should be regulator and 
regulatee. However, from the reality, the relationship between them are like superior and 
subordinates. In one word, the status of  self-regulation has not been improved essentially. 
 
2.4 The allocation of  regulatory power in Chinese securities markets 
2.4.1 The regulatory duties and powers of  the CRSC 
 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission has a variety of  powers in securities 
regulation, they can be summarised as followed: 
  
Regulatory powers on the listed companies 
 
(1) The power of  rule-making. Authorised by the Chinese Securities Law, the CRSC has 
the power to formulate regulatory rules and codes on listed companies. 
 
(2) The administrative permissions. The CRSC has the power to examine and approve the 
listed companies to issue securities, acquisitions, assets reorganisation; and exchanges to 
enact rules stricter than the Chinese Securities Law for company listing. 
 
(3) Regulation on disclosure. The CRSC has the power to regulate the disclosure with listed 
companies and relative obligors and set up standards reports like annual reports, interim 
reports and changes in shares held by relative obligors. 
 
                                                   
20 Provision about regulating securities exchanges 2001. 
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(4) Regulation on corporate governance. The CRSC has the power to raise an objection to 
the candidate of  a director in the listed company, to set requirements on essential 
provisions in articles of  association of  listed companies and to establish regulatory credit 
file. 
 
(5) Examination, investigation and disclosure of  the result of  investigation. The CRSC has 
the power to conduct on-site inspection to the listed companies.; to investigate the 
company if  the CRSC finds out activities which damaged interest of  the company or finds 
out that the company faces significant risks, severe loss or other severe consequences, and; 
to choose to disclose the results of  examination or investigation, which are based on the 
severity of  the activities. 
 
(6) Punishment. The CRSC has the power to punish the listed company and its controlling 
shareholders and executives based on their illegal activities. For the activities involved the 
crimes will be turned over to judiciary authorities. The CRSC also has the power to demand 
the exchanges to punish the listed companies. 
 
Regulatory powers on the securities companies 
 
(1) The power of  rule-making. Authorised by the Chinese Securities Law, the CRSC has 
the power to formulate regulatory rules and codes on securities companies. 
 
(2) The administrative permissions. The CRSC has the power to examine and approve the 
establishment of  securities company and its branch; scope of  business and; qualification 
of  senior managers. 
 
(3) Examination. Based on the principles of  compliance and prudential regulation, the 
CRSC has the right to conduct examinations on securities companies. 
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(4) Investigation and punishment. The CRSC has the power to investigate securities 
companies and employee on the activities like damage to the interest of  clients or 
disrupting the order of  the securities markets and; to conduct administrative punishment 
or form a lawsuit once the illegal activities are confirmed. 
 
Regulatory powers on the securities trading 
 
(1) The power of  rule-making. Authorised by the Chinese Securities Law, the CRSC has 
the power to formulate regulatory rules and codes on securities trading. 
 
(2) The administrative permissions. The CRSC has the power to examine and approve the 
new products and the rules about securities registration, deposit and clearing. 
 
(3) Day-to-day examination. The CRSC has the power to examine the business and other 
status of  the securities exchanges. 
 
(4) Investigation and punishment. The CRSC has the power to investigate the securities 
trading on the activities like damage to the interest of  clients or disrupting the order of  
the securities markets; to collect evidence, to enquire, to consult and copy relative materials, 
to apply to freeze and; to conduct administrative punishment once the illegal activities are 




According to the Chinese Securities Law, The CRSC has some other powers, including: 
regulating securities exchanges and their executives; regulating securities association and 
guiding it with qualification examinations among securities employees and; regulating other 
securities organisations, such as securities fund management companies, securities 
consulting companies and securities credit rating agencies. 
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According to the Article 102, Chinese Securities Law, the definition of  securities exchange 
is ‘A legal person, which is set up according to the relative laws and administrative legislations and approved 
by the national regulatory authority, provides a place for centralised bidding for the securities without 
profiting objective’. In addition, the Article 11, Provision about regulating securities exchanges 
has clearly stipulated the 6 functions of  securities exchanges: 
 
(1) Providing place facility for securities trading. 
 
(2) Formulating operational rules, organising and regulating securities trading. 
 
(3) Approving the applications of  company listing and arranging the issuance of  securities. 
 
(4) Regulating and publishing market information. 
 
(5) Regulating the listed companies and securities companies. 
 





According to the Constitution of  Chinese Securities Association21, 7 functions can be 
summarised: 
                                                   
21 Constitution of Chinese Securities Association 2011. 




(1) Formulating the legislations of  self-regulation, practice standards and conducting self-
regulation to the members and their employees. 
 
(2) Examining and assessing the credit condition of  the disclosure of  information. 
 
(3) Educating and training the investors and the employees, and organising examinations 
for the qualification of  the employees. 
 
(4) Conducting security risk assessment to the vital information systems of  securities 
companies. 
 
(5) Conducting self-regulation including reviewing the securities companies and regulating 
securities investment funds and securities investment consulting companies. 
 
(6) Reflecting the suggestions and demands of  the members to the CRSC and mediating 




Securities intermediaries like securities companies, investment counsellor, accountant and 
lawyer play an important role in the operation of  securities market. It is inefficient for the 
regulatory authority alone to conduct securities regulation, any securities regulation 
systems must base on the self-restraint and self-regulation of  the participants of  the 
markets.  
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3. The main paths of stock leverage financing 
 
This section will discuss different paths of  stock finance before 2015 Chinese Stock Crash. 
 
3.1 Securities companies 
 
The stock financing transactions led by securities companies contained margin trading and 
stock return swaps. According to the statistical material, the peak amount of  stock 
financing transactions was ¥2.27 trillion and the amount of  stock return swaps was ¥421.8 
billion, accounting for 50% of  total leverage funds. 
 
3.1.1 Margin trading 
 
In 2005, the new Chinese Securities Law lifted its ban on securities margin trading and 
short selling. In March 2010, the SEE and SZSE officially started the business with margin 
trading and short selling. 
 
Considering the risk of  leverage trading, the Chinese Securities Law has a strict regulation 
on it. The investors need to apply for this operation and take credit standing examinations 
from multiple agencies. In addition, they can only conduct transactions with appointed 
securities companies and the amount of  securities assets in the account must beyond 
¥500,000. Nevertheless, the requirements set by the exchanges include: the leverage ratio 
shall not exceed 100%; investors take the purchased stock and retained funds in credit 
account as collateral, once the net asset value is below 130% of  the principal and interest 
of  the leveraged funds, the securities company will conduct forced liquidation.  




With the development of  securities margin trading and short selling, the securities 
companies found that the equity fund and borrowed fund cannot fulfil the clients’ demands. 
Then the securities companies started to receive capital from the financial products of  
banks. In practical terms, the securities companies packaged the earnings of  underlying 
securities and sold it to the banks. On the other hand, the banks would purchase the 
earning right with the capital raised from financial products. After that, securities 
companies would repurchase the earning right with a set price and return the capital to the 
banks. 22  The reason they use repurchase transaction is for avoiding the regulation. 
According to the requirements proposed by China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC), there is a limit for banks to keep ‘non-standard’ credit assets, and the earning of  
securities margin trading and short selling will be very likely to be classified into ‘non-
standard’ credit assets. However, through packaging the transactions to repurchase 
agreements, the Notice23 will not affect them. 
                                                   
22 Notice about standardising the operations in financial product investments of commercial banks 
2013. 
23 ibid. 




Picture 1 The connection between financial products to financing business 
3.1.2 Stock return swaps 
 
Stock return swaps is a kind of  derivative transactions, contract parties agreed to swap the 
earning of  underlying stock and fixed interest for a certain of  time in the future. After 
2013, this transaction has changed from a traditional risk management tool to another path 
in providing capital to private placement. 
 
From the economic perspective, the essence of  stock return swaps is borrowing, that is to 
say, the securities companies lend money to clients and the clients pay the fixed interest 
(which can be viewed as interest of  the loan) to securities companies. Before the stock 
market crash, the leverage of  stock return swaps was 3 times to 5 times, far exceeds the 
securities margin trading and short selling. In November 2015, this kind of  transactions 
were suspended by the CRSC. 
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3.2 Trust Company: umbrella structured trust 
 
The umbrella structured trust managed by the trust companies are the main way in capital 
financing before the stock crash. Since 2009, the trust companies have invented ‘umbrella 
structured’ securities investment trust to deal with the temporal regulatory limits on 
opening securities accounts as trust plans. Compared to single structured trust, the 
umbrella structured trust has several trust units under one trust plan, while every unit 
following different investment advices invest respective securities, they all share one 
securities account from the trust plan.24 
 
As the main clients of  the securities investment trust are private funds and institutional 
investors, so the trust often also has the characteristic of  ‘structured’. Specifically, the 
capital in every unit is divided into first and normal class: For the first class capital, 
commonly it is subscribed by the investors of  the private funds and financial products 
from the banks. For the normal class capital, it is subscribed by the managers of  the private 
funds and institutional investors. The investors of  normal class capital (borrower) will be 
delegated as investment advisors for each trust unit by the trust companies and the 
investment of  all the capital (including first and normal class capital) in each unit will be 
decided by the advisors and executed by the trust companies. Every unit has initial margin 
requirement and maintenance margin requirement. If  the value falls below the initial 
margin requirement, the investor of  normal class will receive a margin call for additional 
capital to reach the initial margin requirement. Once the value falls below the maintenance 
margin requirement or the investor fail to deposit additional capital timely, the trust 
companies will close the position to prevent the further loss and secure the interest and 
principal of  the first class.  
 
                                                   
24 Although the CRSC abolished the limit in 2011, the umbrella structured trust continued to be 
applied in the market due to its convenience and low-cost to set up. 
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In 2014, the umbrella structured trust had been applied more extensively and showed two 
new characteristics: 
 
Firstly, the capital from the financial products of  banks started to subscribe the first class 
capital of  each trust unit at 1:2 to 1:3 percentage, and the Directional Asset Management 
Plans (DAMPs) provided by the securities companies became the channel between the 
trust companies and the banks. The reason for this extra step is to avoid regulation from 
the CBRC as there was a limit in 2010 on cooperative financial products between trust 
companies and banks. In the notice, the CBRC required the banks to include such products 
into balanced sheet and stipulated the proportion value of  such products cannot exceed 
30% of  total cooperative business.25  Therefore, with the help of  DAMPs and channels 
provided by the subsidiary of  private funds, the banks could subscribe the first class capital 
in umbrella structured trust. 
 
Secondly, in 2014-2015, not only the traditional institutional investors, but also the private 
finance companies became the investors of  the normal class capital. Due to the relatively 
low cost in capital, the private finance companies structured the capital again into so-called 
‘small umbrella’ and provided to their clients as financing, the leverage was extended 
further. Last but not least, as the nature of  umbrella structured trust still belongs to 
collective fund trust, there are some conditions for the investors to invest according to The 
rules of  trust company on collective fund trust.26 However, as the private finance companies 
providing these services, many small investors can also use leverage to invest which 
somehow overthrew the conditions of  investors. 
                                                   
25 Notice about standardising the cooperative financial products between trust companies and 
banks 2010. 
26Please Article 6, The rules of trust company on collective fund trust 2009.  
One of the most important conditions is ‘each investment shall be at least 1 million RMB’, thus, 
most of the small investors are not qualified to invest. 




Picture 2 Umbrella Structured Trust 
 
3.3 Fund Manager  
3.3.1 Directional Asset Management Plans (DAMPs) 
In 2012, the government restarted the plan of  securitisation of  asset and financial 
innovation. One of  the results was that the structured accounts under the DAMPs became 
a new path for stock finance. Among them, the DAMPs issued by subsidiaries of  mutual-
funds were the most successful, and the structure of  this single structured fund product 
was very similar to structured securities investment trust. 
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In practice, according to Provision about asset management plans issued by funds27, the subsidiaries 
of  funds issued DAMPs and invested into securities market. Then the DAMPs divided the 
clients into first and normal class, likewise, the first class is for the financial products of  
the banks, who in fact became the borrower of  the normal class clients. In addition, the 
leverage ratio was 5 times, and the investment could be decided by normal class clients or 
the fund.  
 
3.3.2 Structured funds 
Structured fund is a portfolio for the fund of  funds (FOF). After dividing the earning of  
the FOF and net asset, two portion (or more) of  different risk returns are formed. (e.g. 
portion A and portion B) In this portfolio, portion A takes fixed return and portion B 
takes the residual earning and net assets of  the FOF. In fact, it is a leverage mechanism 
that the holder of  portion A provides money to the holder of  portion B to buy the 
portfolio of  the FOF, while the holder of  portion B pays interest of  financing. 
 
The leverage mechanism of  structured fund, which affects the stock markets, is different 
from other leverage mechanisms mentioned in this article. For example, on the aspect of  
downside momentum of  stock market due to deleveraging, the reflection of  other leverage 
mechanisms is about closing the position (selling the stock), while the structured funds use 
‘adjustment mechanism and redemption of  holder of  portion A’ to force FOF sell the 
stock in portfolio. Specifically, in the establishment of  FOF, the net portion value per unit 
of  both portion A and B shall be ¥ 1, and the proportion shall maintain around 1:1. Due 
to the existence of  leverage, the decline of  stock market will cause the portion value of  
portion B dropping rapidly. In this case, to secure the interest of  holder of  portion A, the 
adjustment mechanism applies: for instance, when the net portion value of  portion B falls 
from ¥1 to ¥ 0.25, the portion B will be merged in order to recover its net value back to 
¥ 1. As the number of  portion B declines due to the merge, accordingly, to maintain the 
                                                   
27 Provision about asset management plans issued by funds 2012. 
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proportion, the number of  portion A will also be reduced to the same number of  portion 
B, the excess portion A will convert to FOF and return to the holder of  portion A. In the 
background of  continues decline in the stock market, the holder of  portion A will 
commonly choose to redeem the FOF to prevent further loss, which gives pressure to the 
FOF to sell the stock in the portfolio and increase the downside momentum in the stock 
market. 
 
3.4 Private finance company and P2P financing 
 
Private finance companies belong to the most typical over-the-counter (OTC) financing; 
in some scholars’ paper it is synonymous with the term ‘OTC financing’. Before 2014, the 
size of  private finance companies was relatively small. After 2014, with the development 
of  the Internet financing, the P2P mode was integrated into private finance business, then 
P2P financing became the most aggressive leverage tool to invest into the stock. A typical 
case in the procedure of  P2P financing is: Investors only need to deposit initial margin and 
choose the leverage and time limit, then the P2P financing platform will provide margin  
 




Picture 3 Private financing and P2P financing 
 
loan to the account. The leverage is often 1:1 to 1:5, in some private finance companies, 
the leverage could be 1:10. By no accident, P2P financing was the first one having problem 
during the stock crash. 
 
4. The legal, technical and market supporting of stock 
leverage financing 
4.1 The legal supporting ── the establishment of  right of  forced liquidation 
 
The main method to protect the right of  creditors is forced liquidation in stock financing, 
especially the OTC financing. However, there were arguments about the right of  creditors 
to conduct forced liquidation in earlier years. 
 
Commonly, the period of  stock financing lasts for 6 months to 1 year. During this period, 
the securities and capital of  the debtor in the agency’s account shall be viewed as collateral, 
once the market value of  the capital and securities fall below the maintenance margin 
requirement, the agency has the right to sell all the securities of  the debtor immediately. 
But according to Chinese Real Right Law and Chinese Guarantee Law 2829 , when the 
securities are treated as collateral, the creditor must discuss with the debtor before the 
transfer of  the collateral. On the other hand, the institutional arrangement of  the forced 
liquidation declares that the disposal of  the collateral is totally controlled by the creditors. 
 
                                                   
28 Real Right Law of the People’s Republic of China 2007. See Article 219 
29 Guarantee Law of the People’s Republic of China 1995. See Article 87 
ICGFREL DISSERTATION 1544918 
30 
 
The concerns stated above once became a great opposition for China to launch the 
securities margin trading and short selling business. To solve this theoretical obstacle, the 
regulatory authority tried to introduce the trust structure.30 To be more specific, all the 
money and securities in the credit account are taken as trust asset, which are held by trustor 
(debtor) and entrusted to trustee (securities company), while the debtor has income right 
and the securities company has security interest. Under this legal framework, because the 
securities company is trustee, so it has right to dispose the securities in the credit account, 
thereby avoiding the argument about forced liquidation. However, the arrangements of  
setting securities company as trustee and debtor as trustor and trust beneficiary are against 
the fundamental principles of  the trust. In a normal trust structure, trustee has the duty to 
actively manage the trust asset to achieve maximum interest for the trustor, while the 
trustor passively receives incoming. But in margin trading and short selling, the situation is 
just the opposite, the debtor as beneficiary actively manage the asset while securities 
company as trustee just passively keeps the asset and enjoys security interest. 
 
Of  course, from the perspective of  legislation, the limitation set upon the disposal of  the 
collateral to creditor is mainly to prevent the situation that the creditor ignores the interest 
of  debtor and undersell the collateral while the value of  collateral is much higher than the 
right of  creditor. However, when the collateral is cash equivalents like the stock of  list 
company, the selling price is the market price, the worry about selling the collateral in an 
unfair price does not exist. On the other hand, from the perspective of  protecting the 
interest of  creditor, taking securities as collateral, its value is easily affected by the market 
fluctuations and the uncertainty of  protecting the right of  creditor is high. When the 
market falls sharply, if  the creditor does not have the right, such as forced liquidation, to 
dispose the collateral timely, the mortgage in the first place loses its meaning. 
 
Therefore, in 2008 the State Council published Regulations on Administration Supervision of  
                                                   
30 Measures for the Administration of the Margin Trading and Short Selling Business of Securities 
Companies 2011. Article 13 
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Securities Company, the article 54 stipulates:31 When the value of  collateral of  the client is 
below the maintenance margin requirements, the securities companies should inform the 
clients to deposit the margin. If  the client fails to deposit the margin timely or fails to repay 
the debt of  margin trading and short selling, the securities should dispose the collateral 
immediately according to the agreement. So far, the arguments about the legality of  forced 
liquidation came to an end.  
 
4.2 The technical supporting ──account opening, stock screening and forced 
liquidation 
In modern securities transactions, the conduct of  rights must rely on the technical 
supporting. In recent years, the success of  financial software like Mecrt, Straight flush and 
Hundsun HOMS systems overcame the technical obstacle. Taking HOMS system for 
example, it is a software invented by Hundsun limited company, and published to market 
in May 2012, the main clients are private equity and trust company. There are two key 
functions of  the HOMS system: The first one is compartment. The system can divide the 
assets managed by private equity and trust company and gives to different traders to 
manage. In addition, different assets managed by the same trader can also be divided. The 
second one is risk management, which means the system can send instructions to manage 
and control the amount of  capital in market. With these two functions, the basic demand 
of  financing companies is fulfilled. General speaking, the financing companies used the 
compartment function of  HOMS system to arrange accounts opening in financing 
companies, which avoided the franchises of  securities companies in account opening. The 
virtual accounts opened by compartment function are not securities accounts that 
registered in the securities companies. But for the investors, the functions of  virtual 
accounts have no difference with the securities accounts registered in securities companies, 
both of  the accounts can realise functions of  ordering, clearing, deposit and withdrawing 
                                                   
31 Regulations on Administration Supervision of Securities Company 2008. See Article 54 
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cash. On the other side, as the accounts are registered in the financing companies, 
technically speaking, the accounts can be controlled by the financing companies. Especially 
the function of  risk management in HOMS system enables the financing companies to set 
up initial margin requirement and maintenance margin requirement. Once the net value of  
the account is lower than the maintenance margin requirement, the financing company can 
conduct forced liquidation to secure the principal and interest of  the leveraged capital 
without stock screening which saves the cost and greatly improves the efficiency. 
 
Under the supporting of  systems like HOMS, the DAMPs issued by subsidiaries of  
mutual-funds, the umbrella structured trust and P2P financing platform all pick up the 
train of  2014 bull market. Financing companies use compartment function to set up 
umbrella structured accounts, which is equal to set up secondary accounts to investors. 
Each investment instruction and liquidation order conducted by the investors are 
independent from each other, all the instructions will be gathered to financing company 
and then then financing company will send collective instructions to securities company. 
Of  course, under this system, the securities regulatory authority can only see the financing 
agencies, and the ultimate investors are covered which is violate the law of  real-name 
securities system. 
 
4.3 The market supporting ── the capital from the banks 
 
After 2013, with the decline of  real estate market, the banks found out that the first class 
capital in securities financing business is the ideal investing target for banks’ financial 
products: under the protection of  forced liquidation, the first class capital has a high level 
of  safety and return. In practice, there are mainly three ways for the banks’ financial 
products to connect to financing: (1) accepting the income right of  margin trading and 
short selling from the securities companies; (2) subscribing the collective trust capital plan 
or the first class capital from the DAMPs issued by subsidiaries of  mutual-funds. (3) 
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investing into private financing companies through trust plan. 
 
Banks as the most important financial institutions are always under a strict regulation in 
China, while the regulation on trust companies is not as strict as the banks. In this situation, 
there were a lot of  cooperation between banks and trust companies, then many bank-trust 
cooperative financial products (BTCFPs) were sold to the society. In the early period, there 
was nearly not regulation on the BTCFPs and the banks avoided many regulations through 
BTCFPs. However, the risk of  this kind of  cooperation and the activities of  avoiding 
regulations gradually captured regulatory authority’s attention, in 2010, the CBRC started 
to strengthen the regulation on the BTCFPs and demand the banks to put this kind of  
product into balance sheet. After that, the banks also sought to cooperate with the asset 
management plans (AMPs) where the regulation was still weak, such as the securities AMPs, 
insurance AMPs and DAMPs issued by subsidiaries of  mutual-funds. 
 
Chinese financial sector applies separate operation, banks, securities companies and 
insurance companies could only operate their main business. But the fiduciary activity is 
different, it is legal structure:  trustor entrusts trustee with independent trust asset, trustee 
has the duty to actively manage the trust asset to achieve maximum interest for the trustor, 
while the trustor passively receives incoming. The trust asset could be any form of  asset. 
Therefore, the trust structure is a ‘natural’ tool to break down the separate operation. 
Generally speaking, the condition of  the AMPs for clients is high and the source of  clients 
is limited, so the AMPs did not develop well in period of  independent development. 
However, the banks’ financial products can concentrate a huge amount of  small capital to 
purchase AMPs and provide resource of  institutional investors, so the combinations of  
financial products with any AMPs will stimulate rapid growth in this area. In practice, when 
the banks found out that the first class capital in financing business is the ideal investing 
target for banks’ financial products, all other AMPs sectors took rapid actions to design 
financial products for the banks to connect. 
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Of  course, while the changes in legal, technical and market aspects activated the leverage 
mechanism, the systemic risk is also activated. The result of  lacking macro-level regulation 
and legislation will be exposed in the stock crash in summer 2015. 
 
5. The arguments on the foundation of the CRSC’s regulation 
and enforcement 
5.1 The purge path of  the CRSC ──from safety of  information, illegal securities 
brokerage business to real-name account system 
In the beginning of  2015, the CRSC stated to pay attention to the OTC leverage. 
Constrained by the regulatory rights, the first target that the CRSC decided to purge is the 
external system management of  the securities companies. On 13th March 2015, the CRSC 
published the Technical instructions on the online securities information system of  the securities 
companies,32 the Article 54 demands that ‘Securities companies should not provide the 
third-party clients with the interfaces related to the online securities server and securities 
trading; All the securities trading orders must be settled in the system controlled by 
securities companies.’ According to the article, all the systems with compartment shall be 
closed. However, there is no actual enforcement to this article until 12th June 2015. On that 
day, the CRSC published Notice about strengthening the regulation on external systems of  securities 
companies33 , and prohibited the securities companies from providing securities trading 
interfaces to the OTC leverage, after that, the increment of  financing through third-party 
online securities trading systems was cut off. 
 
From the operational level, as the securities trading orders must give through the securities 
                                                   
32 Technical instructions on the online securities information system of the securities companies 
2015. 
33 Notice about strengthening the regulation on external systems of securities companies 2015. 
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companies, the action of  prohibiting the securities companies from providing securities 
trading interfaces to external systems is the most effective way to control the OTC leverage. 
Especially when the CRSC does not have jurisdiction over the OTC agencies like trust 
companies and P2P financing platforms, the action is the most effective and timely way 
under that circumstance. Because the external information systems provided by the 
securities companies are only the tools for providing convenience to the financing agencies, 
and the securities companies themselves should not take responsibility to the activities 
(forced liquidation) which caused market crash, so the CRSC chose an ambiguous reason 
── safety of  information as legal foundation of  the enforcement. However, the reason 
‘safety of  information’ cannot support the CRSC to further purge OTC leverage, so the 
CRSC began to find new legal foundation. 
 
On 12th July 2015, the CRSC published Suggestions about purging and re-organising illegal activities 
in securities operations34, and purged the activities including opening virtual securities account, 
borrowing and using other’s securities account, lending securities account and acting 
trading securities. After that, the AMPs issued by subsidiaries of  mutual-funds, securities 
companies and futures companies are also included into the list of  purge. 
 
Finishing purging the AMPs in its own jurisdiction, the CRSC started to seek cooperation 
with the CBRC to deal with an important part of  this market crash ── trust plan leverage. 
On 17th September 2015, the CRSC again published Notice about continuing purging and re-
organising illegal activities in securities operations,35 and required securities companies to purge 
three kinds of  trust product accounts, including: sub-accounts, operating accounts, virtual 
accounts, umbrella structured trust accounts and structured securities investment accounts. 
However, at this time, the resistance that the CRSC faces seems to be harder to deal with, 
it is more difficult to investigate the public information. In other words, the strength of  
                                                   
34 Suggestions about purging and re-organising illegal activities in securities operations 2015. 
35 Notice about continuing purging and re-organising illegal activities in securities operations 
2015. 
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enforcement of  the CRSC seems to decline. 
 
Notably, although the industry summarised the purge actions of  the CRSC as purge 
leverage. The leverage itself  has never been official legal foundation of  enforcements. The 
legal foundations of  purging leverages are Chinese Securities Law, Article 122 36  and 
Article 16637. Although the CRSC did not refer to specific securities business, the illegal 
operational business should be securities brokerage business.38 From two articles, activity 
that the CRSC accuses should be the same, that is opening virtual accounts. 
 
5.2 The dilemma of  the logic of  real-name regulation 
 
Under the situation of  lacking legislation to limit the OTC leverage, using the legal 
foundation of  purging virtual accounts to purge leverage, the logic of  the regulation 
cannot prosecute to the end. For example, in the logic of  real-name regulation, the 
umbrella structured trust is prohibited while single structured trust is still permitted. 
However, there also are many structured accounts in single structured trust, they are the 
real leverage capital even it is in the single structured trust. On the contrast, some part of  
sub-trust in the umbrella structured trust is management trust without leverage. So, for the 
objective of  purging leverage capital, it seems that the single structured trust should be 
prohibited and the management trust shall be permitted.  
 
                                                   
36 Article 122: Any organisation and individual are not allowed to manage securities business 
unless the approval of the regulatory authority of the State Council. 
37 Article 166: Investors who authorise the securities companies to conduct securities trading 
should apply for registering securities accounts.  
38  The leverage business can only be related to secondary market and all the decisions of 
investments are decided by the investors, so it also cannot be related securities asset management 
business, securities investment consult or financial consult. 
ICGFREL DISSERTATION 1544918 
37 
 
6. Facing the leverage: the new situation in stock secondary 
market and adjustment of the regulatory ideas 
 
The 2015 stock crash reveals that the unregulated OTC leverage could cause systemic risk, 
it is reflected as the overlap of  three phenomena: (1) the liquidity risk embedded in the 
system of  forced liquidation. (2) the enlargement of  the high-leverage transactions on the 
risks. (3) the capital of  bank’s financial products almost involved all the financial 
institutions and spread the risk from the capital markets. 
 
6.1 The evolution of  the risk under the stock leverage transactions 
 
From the legal structure, all the leverage paths except the structured funds are belong to 
stock collateral loans, the key arrangement is that the creditors protect their interest on 
basis of  forced liquidation. This innovation eliminated the information asymmetry in the 
process of  society financing, creditors do not need to investigate the credit status of  the 
debtors, instead, they only need to make sure there is enough collateral to realise timely. 
However, this safeguard mechanism is procyclical. When the price of  stock rise, the price 
of  collateral will rise with it, and this will attract more capital into the stock market to 
further push up the stock price; But this circulation will not last forever, once there is no 
new capital, the price of  stock falls to maintenance margin requirement, the debt reaches 
maturity immediately. When a huge amount of  debts reaching maturity at the same time, 
this could cause a liquidity risk in the capital market. The situation has nearly no difference 
with the run on the bank. 
 
Tracing back to this stock crash, after publishing the notice39 on 12th June 2015, the price 
                                                   
39 Notice about strengthening the regulation on external systems of securities companies (n 33). 
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of  stock stated to fall due to no support from new capital. Because the leverage ratio can 
reach 1:10, at this time, the price of  the stock only needs to decline to 93.6% of  the bid 
price, the forced liquidation could trigger even without a limit down. Therefore, after 
cutting the new capital, the price of  stock falls to the maintenance margin requirement 
with the highest leverage ratio account. In the process of  forced liquidation, the short 
selling of  stock leads to a further drop, and trigger the second highest leverage ratio 
account to forced liquidation. Due to the information of  OTC leverage is not clear, neither 
regulators nor market participants know the amount of  downside momentum. 
Furthermore, the continuous decline of  the stock price causes many non-leveraged 
investors to join the short-selling. Nevertheless, in some extreme cases during continuous 
decline of  the stock price, the protection of  forced liquidation to the creditors may also 
fail, even for those leveraged project fit the requirements, the loss of  creditors is inevitable. 
Finally, the safety of  the first class capital, provide by banks’ financial products, was 
endangered by the process of  deleveraging and nearly caused systemic crisis. 
 
6.2 Some suggestions to improve the regulation 
 
From the experience of  International markets, neither the 1929 Wall Street crash nor 2008 
financial crisis had directly prohibited the leverage mechanism in the securities markets. 
Instead, more active regulations including disclosure of  information and limit on the 
leverage ratio were applied. The idea of  Chinese regulatory authority needs to adapt the 
new situation that leveraged transactions will exist in the secondary stock market.  
 
Some suggestions are made as followed to help improve the regulation on the business 
leverage: 
 
1. Put the OTC private financing agencies and business into the securities regulatory 
framework. 




According to the nature of  the activities of  the OTC private financing agencies, they can 
be under the jurisdiction of  the CRSC, and only those agencies approved by the CRSC 
could start relative business. Meanwhile, it is suggested to establish an OTC financing 
condition system, the system is similar to the stock market system while the condition of  
amount of  capital and ratio of  leverage will be matching with the risk tolerance of  the 
investors, thus having a multi-level and contained risk group of  stock investors. 
 
2. Establish a reporting system on the institutional investors to increase the market 
transparency. 
 
This reporting system is the institutional arrangement for controlling the system risk in the 
futures markets. When the member or client has reached certain amount of  position, he 
or she must report to the exchange about the condition of  account, condition of  
transactions, source of  the funds and the motive of  transactions. Therefore, the exchange 
will know if  there is over speculation or manipulation in the markets. 
 
3. Cooperation among the regulatory authorities to control the source and amount of  
leverage capital 
 
Establishing a regulatory cooperative framework, including joint conference, consultation 
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Provision about asset management plans issued by funds 2012 
Provision about regulating securities exchanges 2001 
Real Right Law of the People’s Republic of China 2007 
Regulations on Administration Supervision of Securities Company 2008 
Securities Act of 1933 1933 
Securities Law of The People’s Republic of China 1998 
Securities Law of The People’s Republic of China 2005 
Suggestions about purging and re-organising illegal activities in securities operations 2015 
Technical instructions on the online securities information system of the securities companies 
2015 
The rules of trust company on collective fund trust 2009 
 
